This volume brings together many of the worldâs leading theorists of free will and philosophers of law to critically discuss the ground-breaking contribution of David Hodgsonâs libertarianism and its application to philosophy of law. The book begins with a comprehensive introduction providing an overview of the intersection of theories of free will and philosophy of law over the last fifty years. The eleven chapters collected together divide into two groups: the first five address libertarianism within the free will debate with particular attention to Hodgsonâs theory and in Part II six contributors discuss Hodgsonâs libertarianism in relation to issues not often pursued by free will scholars such as mitigation of punishment the responsibility of judges the nature of judicial reasoning and the criminal law process more generally. Thus the volumeâs importance lies not only in examining Hodgsonâs distinctive libertarian theory from within the free will literature but also in considering new directions for research in applying that theory to enduring questions about legal responsibility and punishment. . Language: English